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Concerns with
“Mutual Constitution”:
A Critical Realist Commentary
Alistair Mutch, Nottingham Trent University, UK
ABSTRACT
The case for “analytical dualism” as a means of approaching sociotechnical action is presented
as an alternative to accounts which tend to conflate agency, structure, and technology. This is
based on the work of Margaret Archer, whose work is in turn located in the traditions of critical
realism. Her commitment to analytical dualism, which stresses both the importance of time in
analysis and the emergent properties of structure, is argued to give a firmer purchase on the
notion of context than the alternatives based on, for example, the work of Giddens and Latour.
Keywords: critical realism; information technology; structure and agency
INTRODUCTION
I want to start from the premise that
what concerns many researchers in this area
is how best to conceptualise the nature of
“context.” From the point of view of those
researching information systems (broadly
constituted), the concern is to avoid what
they perceive as being, at best, an over-
emphasis on technical factors and, at worst,
the charge of technological determinism.
They are keen, therefore, to emphasise the
importance of the organisational, social, and
cultural context in situating the development
and use of technological artefacts. In this
they are joined by those studying informa-
tion behaviour who are concerned with
moving away from a simple model of an
“environment” in which behaviours are
selected “rationally” towards the ongoing
interaction of context and action. In this
endeavour, the notion of “mutual constitu-
tion” is seductive, and the seduction is re-
inforced by those whose concepts are
turned to for support. For some, this is the
actor-network theory (ANT) of Bruno
Latour and others, where there is a strong
emphasis on action embedded in networks.
For those working in this tradition, the re-
moval of the hyphen from “socio-techni-
cal” is a deliberate act designed to stress
the ineradicable coupling of the social and
the technical. “Sociotechnical” action,
therefore, represents the solution of the
problem of context by its conflation into
networks of actants. Not all analysts in this
area, however, would wish to go so far, and
so, as in other areas of the study of
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organisation, the theorist of choice is often
Anthony Giddens and his notion of
“structuration.” What is taken from this is
the mutual constitution of structure and
agency, where structures form the ever-
present conditions for the production and
reproduction of agency. The strength of
such notions is their emphasis on the irre-
vocable interconnections between action
and context, but their weakness, it will be
argued, is a tendency to privilege action
over context. That is, when we explore
these approaches in a little more detail, we
find that they do not help as much as we
might like in the specification of context.
These criticisms will be addressed briefly
but, as they have been considered else-
where (Jones, 1999; Mutch, 2002), the main
part of the argument will be devoted to the
presentation of an alternative approach.
The contention is that ideas drawn from
the philosophical tradition of critical real-
ism, and specifically from the application
to social theory by the sociologist Marga-
ret Archer, are of much more value both in
specifying what we mean by context and
in conceptualising the relationship between
context and action. This is, therefore, an
act of what Basil Bernstein (1996) calls
“secondary recontextualisation.” That is,
the aim is to introduce some of the ideas
and show how these can help existing ap-
proaches. Accordingly, after a brief intro-
duction to some of the key tenets of criti-
cal realism, we look in a little more detail at
what Archer has to say about the nature of
structures (our “context”) and the relation-
ship of structure to agency (our “action”).
The key argument is that, whilst there is no
society (and hence no technology and no
information) without people, the challenge
is to examine the interaction between the
structures which people create (including
information and technology) and the sub-
sequent action in which people engage.
These more general ideas are then explored
in the context of writings on organisations
and technology. It is important to stress here
that critical realism does not purport to be
a substantive theory of either of these two
domains; rather, it offers some conceptual
clarity on ontological and epistemological
issues, which can further help the develop-
ment of domain-specific theories.
For Latour, the “classic” question of
the relationship between agency and struc-
ture is a case of asking the wrong ques-
tion. His focus is on the enrolment of a
variety of actors (sometimes “actants,” to
distinguish non-humans from humans) in
networks of greater or lesser scale and
scope (Latour, 1993). The consequence is
an extremely helpful language for describ-
ing processes that, in the hands of the adept,
can be illuminating, but can also lead sim-
ply to the production of more or less inter-
esting stories. The particular value from
ANT is the notion of “being specific about
technology,” but what we tend to get is an
excellent language for describing process
with the fading of context into the back-
ground (Montiero & Hanseth, 1995). It may
be for these reasons that rather more at-
tention is paid to the work of Giddens
(Walsham, 1992; Yates & Orlikowski,
1992). We need to be cautious here: it is
not the purpose of this article to review the
way in which Giddens has been employed,
but we can take the comment of
Hasselbladh and Kallinikos to stand in for
many similar examples:
“It is not our task to defend structuration
theory. However, we would like to observe
that the analysis undertaken by Barley and
Tolbert…does not have much in common with
Giddens’ basic ideas.” (Hasselbladh &
Kallinikos, 2000, p, 716; e.g., Phillips, 2003,
p. 221)
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What is it, however, that people seem
to be drawing from Giddens? It would
appear to be the notion that structure is
important in forming the context which
both enables and constrains action. A
series of concepts are provided (struc-
tures of signification, legitimation, and
domination) which provide a more finely
grained conceptualisation of structure.
However, whether what people take from
Giddens and what is actually in Giddens
are the same is open to some question. This
revolves around Giddens’ conception of
structures as “memory traces” instantiated
in action. This is a rather weak
conceptualisation of structure, possibly
weaker in practice that those who use it
care to acknowledge (Jones, 1999). A
rather large claim might be that in practice
those who use Giddens are using the no-
tion of structure in the rather stronger sense
than Margaret Archer uses it. She has been
one of Giddens’ most trenchant critics, but
before turning to her work, we need to
briefly explore some key tenets of critical
realism, as this might be an unfamiliar set
of ideas to many.
CRITICAL REALISM:
AN INTRODUCTION
We need to be clear at the outset that
critical realism is a philosophical tradition
that sees itself as “under-labouring” for
other theories in both the natural and social
sciences (Sayer, 1992). For these reasons,
it is strictly speaking incorrect to talk about
a critical realist analysis of organisations,
technology, information, or any other phe-
nomenon. Rather, substantive theories
that address these domains can use the
resources for conceptual  clari ty
(Cruickshank, 2003b). At its heart, critical
realism is an endeavour concerned with
ontology. The realism indicates that the tra-
dition asserts that there is a reality inde-
pendent of our knowing of it which has in-
transitive status. However, it rejects the
notions drawn from what we might term
scientific realism in the natural sciences,
or positivism in the social sciences, that
there is any direct access to this reality.
Even in the natural sciences, where experi-
mental closure can be reached in some
cases, our knowledge of reality is not a re-
flection. Rather, it involves acts of inter-
pretation at all stages, from observation
through to theory building. Much of our
progress in the latter moves through the
creative use of language, especially of
metaphor (Lewis, 1999; Lopez, 2003). So
critical realism makes bold claims about
ontology, but is altogether more relaxed
about epistemology. Here, there can be
multiple contending ways of knowing.
Whether one is better than the other de-
pends on its relation to what it is that we
seek to know, not on its internal features.
Within these basic conceptions, critical re-
alism argues for an ontology of depth. That
is, it pays due attention to the emergent
nature of phenomena. Thus, in the work of
Stephen Rose (1993) on the brain, memory
is a system property of the brain which
emerges from material substance, but
which is not reducible to particular parts of
that material. Critical realism is, then, anti-
reductionist in method and places empha-
sis on emergence and systemic properties
at the relevant level of enquiry. It also sug-
gests that we need to distinguish between
the empirical, the actual, and the real. For
critical realists, the empirical are simply
surface sensations that are the product of
deeper mechanisms. What actually happens
may be disguised by these surface mani-
festations. However, the actual in its turn
is produced by the real mechanism, and it
is these mechanisms which analysts and
scientists seek to explore. The object of
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study, therefore, should be the underlying
mechanisms that produce surface manifes-
tations, mechanisms which might not be
apparent. They may, for example, only be
activated in certain circumstances, or their
impact may be confounded by the work-
ings of counter-mechanisms (as noted later,
we will often talk of “tendencies” rather
than mechanisms in looking at the social
world).
These propositions are derived in large
part from the studies in the philosophy of
science carried out by Roy Bhaskar
(Collier, 1994). However, Bhaskar also has
a considerable concern with human activ-
ity, and developed a Transformational Model
of Social Activity which drew on the work
of Giddens. This work has led to the emer-
gence of an interest in his ideas in a num-
ber of domains in the social sciences, with
prominent figures being Andrew Sayer
(2000) in geography and Tony Lawson
(2003) in economics. However, the most
trenchant critic of Bhaskar’s use of Giddens
— and the theorist to develop the ideas in
the most detail in the social domain — has
been Margaret Archer. Archer is a soci-
ologist of education who has developed
since the 1970s a set of rich and complex
ideas which found their fullest expression
in a series of (to date) four books (Archer,
1995, 1996, 2000a, 2003). These are closely
interlinked, but deal with separate aspects
of the relationship between agency, struc-
ture, and culture. She terms this the “mor-
phogenetic” approach — “morpho” being
the element stressing change, “genetic”
emphasising the importance of agency.
There has been a move over the series to-
wards a greater degree of concern with
the nature of agency, but always with a
strong focus on the objective characteris-
tics of the context in which agency oper-
ates. In the comments below I am forced
to simplify what is a complex body of work,
with the twin aims of introducing the work
(possibly sending people to the originals)
and exploring how it might form a better
set of concepts for the exploration of con-
text than notions of mutual constitution.
Let us start with the nature of struc-
tures. Archer (1995) identifies two prevail-
ing approaches to the nature of structure
and agency. One is that which she terms
“downward conflationism,” which she finds
in traditions such as structuralism, where
social action is, as it were, simply “read
off” the nature of structure. In such ap-
proaches agency becomes a mere epiphe-
nomenon, with agents merely the bearers
of structure. In such a situation the task of
analysts becomes simply to find the keys
to unlock the code of structure, which once
discovered will reveal all the answers.
Those approaches which deploy forms of
technological determinism might exhibit
some of these attributes, where social con-
sequences are seen to flow inevitably from
the fact of technical implementation. The
other dominant approach, developed often
in opposition to structuralist approaches, is
one which places all the attention on the
interaction of agents and sees structures
as either irrelevant or, again, a mere tran-
sient by-product of action. Her targets here
are those which operate under the broad
rubric of “methodological individualism” and
she has been particularly concerned to
counter the claims of rational choice theo-
rists (Archer, 2000b). These she would term
“upwards conflationists” and these ap-
proaches would, in turn, be rejected by
Giddens. His structuration theory is de-
signed to avoid the false polarity engen-
dered by either of the approaches we have
outlined, but, Archer argues, in his formu-
lations he falls into the trap of what she
terms “central conflationism.” The prob-
lem here is that in eliding the differences
between agency and structure, in arguing
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for their mutual constitution, Giddens re-
moves the analytical purchase which can
be gained from holding the two terms apart.
Archer stresses the notions of emergent
properties and temporality in arguing for a
stronger conception of structure, which then
leads to her argument for “analytical dual-
ism.” Her argument is that, whilst struc-
tures are created by people, those people
are not “those here present now.” That is,
the structures that are produced by social
interaction then take on objective status for
future rounds of social interaction. Their
emergent properties, emergent from but not
reducible to the previous actions of so-
cial actors, have causal powers in shap-
ing and enabling future projects. What
do we mean here by “structure?” Archer
suggests a number of components —
roles, organisations, institutions, and sys-
tems — that are inter-related and have
primacy, depending on the context of analy-
sis. This allows us some purchase on the
relationship between the local and the glo-
bal. Archer (1996) also further elaborates
her account by considering the relationship
between structure and culture. She is con-
cerned in her account of culture to explode
what she terms the “myth of cultural inte-
gration,” the notion that culture presupposes
an integrated and necessarily harmonious
set of relations, and suggests a need to
analyse culture as a set of propositions
about the world, some of which can be in
logical contradiction with each other. We
will take this notion of contradiction fur-
ther below, but having presented an outline
of the formation of structure (to use that
as a shorthand just now for the combina-
tion of structure and culture), we have to
consider the implications for agency.
Archer (1995) argues that for the
purpose of analysis, we need to hold
agency and structure apart. This “analyti-
cal dualism” is quite clear in recognising
that concrete situations will involve ele-
ments of agency and structure in complex
interactions. She suggests that the way of
getting at such situations is to engage in
the production of analytical narratives that
aim to tease out the relationship between
agency and structure through a series of
what she terms “morphogenetic” cycles
(the “morpho” referring to the potential for
change, the “genetic” referring to agential
involvement). In each such cycle we start
with the prior structural conditioning, ex-
ploring how this shapes and enables social
interaction. In turn, such interaction elabo-
rates structures, either by changing them
or, perhaps more frequently, reproducing
and confirming them. In considering how
structures form the context for action, we
need to return to the logical relations of
contradiction and complementarity. Such
relations can exist within structures (such
as within the institutions of law or the fam-
ily), within cultures (such as contending
ideas of the family), or between structures
and cultures (such as when practices of
family life are in distinction to theories
about how that practice should be con-
ducted). Archer is anxious to argue that
the existence of logical contradictions does
not necessarily mean a clash between
social groups. Such contradictions may lie
unnoticed and “unactivated” if there are
no actors with the interest in deploying
them. What such combinations of contra-
dictions and complementarities give us
(and Archer explores various combinations
in considerable depth) are logics for situ-
ated action. Such logics may not be picked
up upon, perhaps because social groups lack
the weight to be able to deploy them. They
may suggest logics of action, but there is
no inevitability about them. However, ac-
tors who chose differently will have to pay
opportunity costs, and their choices may
bring them to accept other logical connec-
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tions which they had not appreciated. So,
for example, one argument might be that
certain assumptions about how to go on are
inscribed into software (Melucci, 1996).
This inscription then confronts those who
use the software with a “natural” and
relatively easy path to follow. However,
they may choose to do otherwise and cre-
ate innovative uses. However, such uses
have opportunity costs in terms of the ef-
fort needed to, say, customise the soft-
ware. In turn, these innovative uses form
the context for future rounds of social in-
teraction. However, this is to make some
assumptions about the nature of social ac-
tion and those who participate in it, and so
we need to consider what Archer has to
say about agency.
A prime concern in Archer’s work
has been to counter both individualistic, ra-
tional choice models of agency and the over-
socialised accounts that produce only “cul-
tural dopes.” Her argument is that we need
to consider more carefully what we take
agency to be, and she suggests a tripartite
division into persons, agents, and actors.
She starts with the embodied person, emer-
gent from but not reducible to their biologi-
cal constitution. These persons are strong
evaluators, able to form and pursue value-
laden projects and to reflect on their
progress towards them (Archer, 2000a).
Such reflection, however, takes different
forms, forms which Archer (2003) relates
to modes of internal conversation. We all
use, she argues, internal conversation to
reflect on our projects, but the forms which
such conversations take differ, and in dif-
fering affect our relations with the objec-
tive world of structure and culture that we
face. This is to take a different line from
Giddens (1991), whose emphasis is on the
knowledgability of all actors, and from oth-
ers, such as Bourdieu (1990), who place a
stronger emphasis on the shaping of dispo-
sitions to act. Archer suggests that there
are potentially three categories of reflexiv-
ity, all with different impacts on the degree
to which persons will collide with structures.
Some she terms “conversational reflex-
ives.” These rely on others to complete
their internal conversations, and so they rely
on a community of others who share their
background assumptions. These people will
avoid conflict with structures by seeking to
steer away from it. Others are “autono-
mous reflexives,” who conduct their con-
versations with themselves and take a stra-
tegic approach. These form the social ac-
tors whose pursuit of projects will lead them
into collision with structures, leading to
structural elaboration or change. The third
category is that of the “meta-reflexive” —
persons who reflect on their own reflexiv-
ity. They are, argues Archer, society’s con-
science, evaluating structure and culture
against a moral yardstick and finding them
wanting. (Archer recognises a fourth cat-
egory, that of the “fractured reflexive,” who
for some reason is not able to conduct a
satisfactory internal conversation and is so
condemned to remain a passive primary
agent, at the mercy of buffeting forces).
Whilst these conversations and evalu-
ations take place at the level of the person,
they are clearly shaped by the category of
agency. For Archer (1995) this is a collec-
tive category, and is one partially consti-
tuted by involuntary positioning. By un-
equally distributed chance, persons are po-
sitioned in various categories of “primary
agency” — as men or women, young or
old, and so forth. In some cases, action is
not needed to attribute primary agency —
the simple fact, Archer argues, of an aging
population has an influence on wider struc-
tures, regardless of whether there are com-
mon bonds or perceptions of them amongst
the elderly. However, of course, such bonds
can emerge and can lead to “corporate
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agency,” which is when a group of agents
perceives a shared interest in joint action
to further what they seem to have in com-
mon. Such agency then shapes the persons
who engage in it, by, for example, giving
them access to differential resources of
language with which to conduct their inter-
nal conversations (Mutch, 2004). It also
forms the preconditions for the role of the
actor. This is the individual engaged in so-
cial action, shaped and enabled by objec-
tive constraints. This could be the occupa-
tion of a particular role, the expectations
for behaviour in which have been shaped
by previous occupants and by the emerg-
ing body of knowledge and ideas about how
to go on in such a role. These suggest ways
in which the actor should go on. The per-
son is, of course, free to do differently, but
only if the costs for so doing are paid.
This, then, is a broad sketch of
Archer’s bold and sophisticated arguments
about the relationship between agency and
structure. To recap, they make strong
claims about the nature of both structure
and agency. They posit the existence of
structures as possessing emergent proper-
ties which have causal powers. Such struc-
tures form the context in which action takes
place. That action is undertaken by strong
evaluators, with intentions to act formed
by their value-laden moral projects. Such
projects may cause them to collide with
existing structures, reproducing them or
challenging them in the process. Structures
provide strong situational logics of action,
but the simple existence of either contra-
diction or complementarity in these logics
has no necessary consequence for action.
Whilst such an approach still insists on the
“mutual constitution” of “the parts and the
people”, it suggests that we need to hold
them apart in order to explore the inter-
relationship between them over time. The
stress is on the construction of analytical
narratives that pay attention to the unfold-
ing of cycles of interaction between agency
and structure over time. It should be clear
that this is a different perspective on “mu-
tual constitution,” but what implications does
this have for the study of organisations, in-
formation, and technology?
CRITICAL REALISM:
IMPLICATIONS
We need to repeat again the warning
that critical realism is not about replacing
or creating anew substantive theories of
particular social domains. It is entirely com-
patible with the reworking of existing theo-
ries, using the ontological clarity that criti-
cal realism claims to offer. We also need
to recognise that Archer’s work is a work
of social theory, in which the objects of at-
tention are societies in the process of
change over large tracts of time and space.
However, she would claim that her ap-
proach could be deployed at a number of
levels of analysis; part of the challenge for
those interested in the analysis of
organisations, information, and technology
is to show how this might be done. It starts,
argues Cruickshank (2003b), through the
construction of domain-specific meta-con-
cepts through the immanent critique of ex-
isting bodies of work. It is not the purpose
of the present argument to construct such
concepts, nor is there the space for such
an endeavour. However, it is possible to
point to some avenues for exploration. There
have already been some rather limited ini-
tial forays, but it should be clear from them
that the enterprise is in its infancy (Ackroyd
& Fleetwood, 2000; Cruickshank, 2003a;
Lopez & Potter, 2001). Two substantial
bodies of work which offer material for
these endeavours that are worthy of fur-
ther review are labour process theory and
the new institutionalism. A wide body of
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work has been produced under the stimu-
lus of labour process theory, initially inspired
by Braverman’s (1974) deskilling thesis, but
often departing far from his original con-
cerns. From this work has emerged the
current focus on critical management stud-
ies, as well as much other valuable work
on the nature of organisations. What unites
much of this otherwise very disparate
work is the focus on conflict and power in
organisations. In recent years much of this
perspective has been brought to bear on
the expanding area of “knowledge man-
agement” (Prichard, Hull, Chumer, &
Willmott, 2000). An example that has con-
siderable relevance for those exploring in-
formation and technology in organisations
is the careful exploration of the impact of
organisational politics on the deployment of
Lotus Notes in a pharmaceutical company
presented by Hayes and Walsham (2000).
This is of importance when set against
much of the literature on information use
in organisations, when the context, as in
Choo (1998), is only lightly sketched in and
is simply seen as the placeholder for indi-
vidual behaviour. However, for many of the
excellent empirical studies emerging out of
this critical tradition, the context is largely
confined to organisational boundaries, with
the broader social and cultural context be-
ing little explored. If we wish to seek ex-
amples of bodies of work that could poten-
tially tie organisations more tightly into their
broader context, then the work of the new
institutionalists might be of some interest.
The new institutionalism in
organisational analysis is a broadly North
American phenomenon, with its roots in
the rejection of rational choice models
(Scott, 2001; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991).
This gives it something of a shared agenda
with some of Archer’s (2000b) concerns.
What is also interesting is the way that in
some incarnations it is concerned with re-
lating what happens in organisations to
broader forces, particularly in situating ac-
tion in the context of taken-for-granted un-
derstanding about appropriate forms for
action and structure. The problem is that in
this endeavour, such forces become all pow-
erful and the organisation becomes reified
into a unitary body whose actions are
largely determined by these taken-for-
granted assumptions (DiMaggio, 1998).
From the perspective of Archer’s morpho-
genetic approach, the problem is an exces-
sive focus on culture, with institutions be-
ing conceived of as cognitive constructions
shorn of their material and social dimen-
sions. These forces are then given exces-
sive weight, in an example of what she
would term “downwards conflationism.”
The space for agency, both within
organisations and on behalf of
organisations, is radically reduced. Such
criticisms are articulated by many who work
within the parameters laid down by the tra-
dition, notably in recent years by Lounsbury
and Ventresca (2003) in their calls for a
“new structuralism.” Whilst we might ar-
gue that any form of structuralism is a dan-
gerous path to follow, the resources pre-
sented by Archer would seem to be valu-
able for these internal critics; in turn, the
arguments presented by these critics are
of value in suggesting some elements of a
distinctly critical realist approach.
One concern is that, broadly speak-
ing, these approaches give relatively little
weight to the inter-twined problematic of
information and technology. Archer, for
example, has barely anything to say about
technology, save for a brief mention in
considering theories of post-industrial so-
ciety (Archer, 1990). However, her ap-
proach of analytical dualism based on
emergent properties seems to fit well with
the perspective elaborated by Andrew
Feenberg in his Questioning Technology
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(2001). Feenberg’s work appears to have
little impact in our domain, judging by the
paucity of citations, but he too starts by
recognising the merits of accounts based
on constructivist approaches. However,
these, he argues, neglect to place their
findings in a broader political context.
Feenberg, as a political philosopher work-
ing in the tradition of Critical Theory, is
anxious to provide an account which situ-
ates technology in a broader context in
order to further a project of democratising
communicative practices (Feenberg, 1991).
Now, we might recognise a wide range of
problems with this project, particularly its
reliance on Habermasian idealism, but for
our current purposes, the interest is in
Feenberg’s account of the nature of tech-
nology, in which he argues for a two-level
model, which can be recast in the form of
analytical dualism. In this case, what is
important is to pay equal attention to the
constitution of technologies and their imple-
mentation in practice, which can be best
done by holding the two apart. For
Feenberg, the two moments are “primary
instrumentalisation”, which has to do with
the constitution of the artefact, and “sec-
ondary instrumentalisation,” which has to
do with realisation. For each, Feenberg
suggests a number of attributes.
For the process of constitution,
Feenberg suggests that there is a process
of the decontextualisation of some fea-
tures from their original context so that
they can be integrated into a technical
system. This depends in turn on reduction-
ism, in which “de-worlded things are sim-
plified, stripped of technically useless quali-
ties, and reduced to those aspects through
which they can be enrolled in a technical
network” (Feenberg, 2001, p. 203). This
enables the object to be considered as an
autonomous one, subject to technical laws.
This then gives the artefact its seemingly
purely technical quality; it has been ren-
dered as such by a process which returns
it back to the world as seemingly being not
of it. However, in order to be part of that
world again, the artefact has to be part of
a social process that is more familiar to
accounts given from, for example, actor-
network theory, with Feenberg using
terms such as “enrolment” to construct
his account of realisation. For example,
he notes:
“To function as an actual device, isolated,
decontextualised technical objects must be
combined with each other and re-embedded
in the natural environment. Systematisation
is the process of making these combinations
and connections, in Latour’s terms, of
‘enrolling’ objects in a network.” (Feenberg,
2001, p. 205)
He also suggests moments in this pro-
cess of mediation and concretisation. In
mediation, ethical and aesthetic consider-
ations supply new qualities to the technol-
ogy which help to accommodate it to the
new context. In concretisation, the tech-
nologies are combined with working prac-
tices to form new ways of working — ways
of working that are clearly a prime con-
cern of those working in this domain.
Feenberg’s approach is then an attempt to
combine what we have learned through
processual views of technology and a con-
cern with the broader context. From the
perspective of critical realism, the concern
is not with the account of technology, which
seems helpful, but with the legacy of Criti-
cal Theory. Here again, the ideas of Ar-
cher can form a more robust view of struc-
ture, but Feenberg’s work provides re-
sources which could help to repair the gap
caused by the lack of consideration of tech-
nology. The importance here is in the em-
phasis on both the objective character of
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the technology as it appears to the user
and the potential for reinterpretation in the
course of social action.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that ideas derived from
critical realism, and in particular the mor-
phogenetic approach of Margaret Archer,
have a considerable amount to offer stu-
dents of organisation, information, and tech-
nology. Whilst such ideas start from the
premise that it is human activity that is cen-
tral to the creation of society, they offer a
better approach to the intertwined relation-
ship of information and technology than
rather vaguer notions of “mutual constitu-
tion.” They do so by offering a stronger
conception of structure than, for example,
Giddens. By using the notion of emergent
powers and stressing the centrality of time,
they draw a stronger picture of structure
and culture, forming an objective context
that humans face in their engagement in
social action. However, persons can choose
— based on their strong evaluation of their
personal projects as value laden — to con-
front or shy away from such structures,
although they cannot avoid their implica-
tions entirely. As agents, such persons are
placed involuntarily in particular positions,
positions which shape their interests and
resources. Deploying these resources as
social actors, they can act in ways other
than their interests and the logic of their
situated action would suggest, but only if
they are prepared to incur the opportunity
costs of their actions. Such is only a brief
sketch of the richness and complexity of
these ideas. It needs to be stressed that
ideas such as these are still under develop-
ment and elaboration in their home domain
of social theory. Their application in the
realm of organisations is in its infancy, but
such an application is not a question of
starting from scratch. Rather, I have tried
to point to some existing ideas and ap-
proaches which would form a part of any
more fully formulated perspective. The
work of formulating such a perspective
continues, but what can we say at this stage
that it offers students of information and
technology?
At a very simple level, we could ar-
gue that more attention to these ideas would
help in sensitising researchers to certain
aspects of context that they ought to be
aware of. The conceptual clarity offered
by the stronger sense of structure would
seem to gel better with the way that re-
searchers seem to conceive of structure in
practice than notions drawn from Giddens.
However, theories also carry with them
logical entailments that go further than
sensitisation (Stones, 1996). For critical
realism the aim of research is the uncover-
ing of the causal powers that are at opera-
tion, albeit that in the human domain we
would express these as tendencies rather
than as laws. We would also be tentative
in our approach, recognising that our con-
clusions, in open systems, can only be cor-
rigible and provisional. However, we would
lay a particular stress on the importance of
time. To construct an analytical narrative
which seeks to explain the tendencies at
work, we need to explore a sufficient
stretch of time. A criticism of much work
that focuses on implementation would be
the timescale of the research. This would
be in two aspects. One would be that the
period examined before the particular fo-
cus of the research is relatively short. From
the discussion above, it is clear that this
period needs to be long enough to be able
to appreciate the shaping of the context that
action takes place in. Secondly, insufficient
attention is often paid to the period of so-
cial action itself and to the subsequent struc-
tural elaboration. Often this is because the
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pace of change at different levels of analy-
sis is compressed, with the impression be-
ing given that taken-for-granted social prac-
tices change at the same pace as
organisational routines (Barley & Tolbert,
1997). Social realism can help us here with
its notions of stratified reality and careful
attention to definitions. However, even at
the level of situated action at the micro level,
our analyses are often too quick to con-
clude that a particular instantiation is a “suc-
cess” or a “failure,” when we are only look-
ing at a brief snapshot. Given that we are
aware of the plasticity of technology and
the creative ability of users, albeit it within
more or less strong contexts, we need to
allow time to unfold to be able to see if
what we are recording are durable effects
or mere growing pains.
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